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Abstract: In a series of papers, Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams have
developed a theory of metaphysical vagueness in which they argue for legiti-
macy of vague object and indeterminate identity. In his recent paper, Ken Akiba
raises two objections against Barnes-Williams theory, concluding that it is
ill-conceived and wrong-headed. In one objection, he argues that the theory
implies indeterminate identity between referentially determinate objects to
which λ-abstraction is applicable, and hence Evans’ argument ultimately goes
through. In the other, he objects that Barnes-Williams theory also fails to block
Salmon’s argument. This paper discusses the two objections. It argues that there
are legitimate reasons for rejecting both, and hence to revive Barnes-Williams
theory. Furthermore, it is shown that the objections, while unsuccessful, are
helpful in revealing the limitations of Barnes-Williams theory.
Keywords: metaphysical vagueness, vague object, indeterminate identity,
Evans’, argument, Salmon’s argument
1 Introduction
In a series of papers,1 Elizabeth Barnes and Robert Williams2 have developed a
theory of metaphysical indeterminacy for a nonrepresentational understanding
of vagueness. According to this theory, metaphysical vagueness is explained as
referential indeterminacy with metaphysical source. In particular, an object, O, is
vague iff “O” is referentially indeterminate and the source of indeterminacy is
the world itself, not representational or epistemic.3 An example could be helpful
in illustrating the idea.
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1 Barnes and Williams (2009, 2011) and Williams (2008a, 2008b).
2 Hereafter, jointly referred by “BW”.
3 See Williamson (1994) and Fine (1975) for Epistemological and Semantical understandings of
vagueness.
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Commonsensically, Mount Kilimanjaro, K, is considered a vague object, in
the sense that for some object, e, it is indeterminate whether e belongs to K.4
According to BW theory, however, the vagueness of K is explained in terms of
referential indeterminacy with metaphysical source; the indeterminacy of part-
hood relation between e and K is explained away as “K” is referentially inde-
terminate between K+ and K-, which are exactly like K except e determinately
belongs to K+ and is determinately disjointed from K-. Furthermore, the source
of this indeterminacy is the world itself.5 Formally, they are committed to the
following statements:6
a) D(K=K- _ K=K+ )
b) ~ D (K =K-) ^ ~ D(K=K+ )
c) I(K=K-) ^ I(K=K+ )
The main attraction of BW characterization of vague object is that it can secure
the advantage of supervaluationism in blocking Evans’ reductio argument7
against indeterminate identity. That is, when b is a referentially indeterminate
object, the derivation from I(a= b) to [λx.I(x= a)]b is illegitimate. Therefore,
Evans’ argument is blocked in the first step.8
4 Here, e could be a simple object (e. g. a partless elementary particles of physics) or an object
sufficiently simpler than K (e. g. an electron).
5 An illustration of how the world can be the source of referential indeterminacy can be found
in Barnes and Williams (2009)
“Suppose it were metaphysically unsettled where an object, Table, was located. Suppose
that is either located between you and Wardrobe, or is in another room entirely: but there
is no fact of the matter which one of these regions it is in. Now introduce the name ‘Front’
to refer to whichever individual is directly in front of you. ‘Front’ will be referentially
indeterminate between Table and Wardrobe, and ‘Table = Front’ will be vague. But the
source of this referential indeterminacy is not any lack of semantic conventions on your
part, but rather the metaphysical indeterminacy in the location of Table” (p. 181).
6 In agreement with BW, determinacy and indeterminacy are understood as modal operators.
“D” and “I” stand for operators “it is determinate that” and “it is indeterminate whether”.
Semantical behaviors of D and I are analogues of necessity and contingency operators in alethic
modal semantics, respectively. In particular, IA iff ~DA ∧ ~D~A. For more details see Parsons
and Woodruff (1995), Barnes and Williams (2011).
7 See Evans (1978).
8 Alternatively, if a is referentially indeterminate vague object, the derivation from ~I(a= a) to
~[λx.I(x= a)]a is illegitimate. Therefore, as long as indeterminate identity statements involve at
least one referentially indeterminate object, Evens’ argument can be blocked. See Lewis (1988)
for the details.
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Ken Akiba, however, doubts that BW theory is logically coherent. In his
recent paper,9 Akiba provides two rigorous arguments against their character-
ization of vague object, claiming that it is ill-conceived and wrong-headed. In one
argument, he objects that BW characterization of metaphysical indeterminacy
ultimately generates indeterminate identity between referentially determinate
objects, RDI, to which λ-abstraction is legitimately applicable. Thus, BW theory
ultimately fails to block Evans’ argument, or so Akiba argues. (E-objection)
In the other, he provides a formalization of Salmon’s argument,10 arguing that
it is different from Evans’ argument in a crucial way: contrary to Evans’ argument,
Salmon’s argument does not use singular terms, but only quantifications and
variables. As a result, the ambiguity between the de re and de dicto readings of
indeterminacy, which exists in Evans’ argument, does not occur in Salmon’s
argument. In fact, the argument must be understood de re. Consequently, BW
cannot appeal to referential indeterminacy to block the argument. (S-objection)
This paper refutes both arguments. In the next section, I argue that not all
cases of vague object characterized in BW theory generate RDI, and hence BW
theory is a viable account for vague objects that do not imply RDI. In the last
section, I discuss S-objection and argue that contrary to what Akiba claims,
validity of his formal proof depends on application of λ-abstraction. As a result,
proponents of BW theory still can block the argument by appealing to referential
indeterminacy of vague objects.
2 E-objection
To demonstrate any vague object characterized in BW theory ultimately gener-
ates RDI, and so is open to Evans’ argument, Akiba chooses an example from
Williams (2008a) and shows that it implies RDI. Let us consider Williams’
example.
Amoebas Example.11 Sue, a particular amoeba, splits into two amoebas, Sally
and Sandy. One of them is a surviving amoeba and the other is a newly minted
amoeba.12 After the fission, Sally wanders off to the East and Sandy to the West.
Williams argues that while Sue and Sandy are vague objects, they do not
9 Akiba (2015).
10 Salmon (1981, 243–46).
11 See (Williams 2008a, 151–2).
12 Also, note that Sue persists as the surviving amoeba.
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generate RDI, so the example is immune from Evans’ argument. Considers the
following two scenarios:
1. We can rigidly denote Sue1
13 via the definite description “the surviving
amoeba”. That is, Sue1 is a vague object which is determinately referred to
by “Sue1”. Moreover, Sandy1 in a vague object which is indeterminately
referred by “Sandy1”.
2. Alternatively, we can rigidly denote Sandy2 via the definite description “the
amoeba that wanders off to the West”. That is, Sandy2 is a vague object
which is determinately referred to by “Sandy2”. However, Sue2 in a vague
object which is indeterminately referred by “Sue2”.
According to Williams, in both cases, it is indeterminate whether Sue is identical
with Sandy, but Evans’ argument does not apply. To see this, consider the
following true statements:
(1) I (Sue1 = Sandy1)
(2) ~I (Sandy1 = Sandy1)
(3) I (Sue2 = Sandy2)
(4) ~I (Sandy2 = Sandy2)
Since Sue1 and Sandy2 are referentially determinate, λ-abstraction is legitimately
applicable on (1) and (4);
(1*) [λx.I (x= Sandy1)] Sue1
(4*) ~[λx.I (x= Sandy2)] Sandy2
Nonetheless, Sandy1 and Sue2 are referentially indeterminate, i. e. “Sandy1” and
“Sue2” do not refer to single objects.
14 Thus, λ-abstraction is not applicable on
(2) or (3), and hence Evans’ argument may not go through.
However, contrary to what Williams claims, Akiba shows that Amoebas
example does generate RDI. Consider the following identity statement
(5) I (Sue1 = Sandy2)
If (1)–(4) are true, (5) is true. Both Sue1 and Sandy2 are referentially determinate,
so (5*) is derivable
13 Indices represent the numbers of the cases.
14 See Lewis (1988).
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(5*) [λx.I (x= Sandy2)] Sue1
Now, we can use Evans’ argument to derive ~I (Sue1 = Sandy2), contradicting
(5).15 Akiba argues that every instance of vague object as characterized in BW
theory, like Amoebas example, generates RDI. Consequently, BW theory com-
pletely fails to provide a proper characterization of vague object. He writes
“If Williams is to succeed in his defense of vague objects along his original lines, he must
come up with another example which has the following feature: it generates true indeter-
minate identity statements involving referential indeterminacy that results from the exis-
tence of vague objects, but it cannot generate true indeterminate identity statements that
only involve determinate references to those vague objects. We have no idea how such an
example is possible.” (2015, 8–9).
In sum, Akiba’s failure to see how an example of a vague object without
generating RDI in BW theory is possible leads him to conclude that his objection
destroys Williams’ defense of vague objects. I call it “immodest conclusion”.16
In the rest of this section, I argue that while Akiba is right that Amoebas
example does generate RDI and hence is open to Evans’ argument, his immod-
est conclusion is untenable. In particular, I present two examples of vague
objects characterized in BW theory without generating RDI, which refute his
conclusion.
2.1 Against E-objection
Providing an example of a vague object without facing E-objection requires to
understand which aspect of Amoebas example entails RDI. That is to say, we
need to understand which aspect of the example allows to fix reference relations
rigidly. It is not hard to see that for both Sue and Sandy there are definite
descriptions that allow to designate them rigidly. Hence, an example of vague
object that does not generate RDI should not be committed to definite descrip-
tions that allow to rigidly denote indeterminately identical objects.
Recall Kilimanjaro example. The following statements are true:
(1) I(K=K+ )
(2) I(K=K-)
15 Note that Williams is committed to (4*) and the modal framework S5 as the logic of
in/determinacy operators.
16 Later in this section, I argue for a modest conclusion of E-objection.
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(3) ~I(K=K)17
However, while there are definite descriptions that rigidly designate K+ and
K-,18 there is no definite description that rigidly denotes K. As a result,
λ-abstraction is not applicable to the above statements. So Evens’ argument
cannot be applied to this example.19
For the second example, I show that even Amoebas example can be mod-
ified in order to not generate RDI. The modification only requires replacing
“Sally wanders off to the East and Sandy to the West” with the following:
After the fission, Sally and Sandy wander off to different directions, i.e. one goes to East
and the other goes to West.
In the modified version of the example still the following statements are held
a) I (Sandy = Sue)
b) ~I (Sandy = Sandy)
Nonetheless, the definite description “the amoeba that wanders off to the West”
does not rigidly refer to Sandy, since Sandy might be the amoeba that wanders
off to the West as well. Consequently, λ-abstraction cannot be legitimately
applied to (a) or (b). Hence the modified version of Amoebas example is immune
from Evans’ argument.
17 Also, note that K- and K+ are determinately distinct.
18 More precisely, “the object that determinately has e as part” and “the object that determi-
nately disjoints from e” rigidly designate K + and K- respectively.
19 We can even go further to ensure that Dual of K does not imply RDI either. Consider K* as an
object that is exactly like K except that e belongs to K if and only if it does not belong to K*. K*





Similar to K, there is no definite description which could rigidly designate K*. As a result,
λ-abstraction is not applicable on above statements either.
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The two examples show that it is perfectly plausible to provide examples
of vague objects characterized in BW theory without generating RDI.
Therefore, Akiba’s immodest conclusion is untenable: E-objection neither
destroys BW theory nor does it show that their project is ill-conceived and
wrong-headed.
Yet, a more modest conclusion can be drawn from E-objection. Indeed the
objection leads us to a better understanding of limitations of BW theory.
Namely, BW theory is unable to characterize all types of vague objects. Cases
of vague objects that generate RDI are not coherently representable in BW
theory. This is a disadvantage of this theory, particularly, when it is compared
to other theories of ontic vagueness. Parsons (2000), Wilson (2013) and
Abasnezhad and Hosseini (2014) provide theories of ontic vagueness and they
block Evans’ argument without appealing to referential indeterminacy.20 This
means, they can characterize cases of vague objects that generates RDI without
facing Evans’ argument. Therefore, in this respect, they are preferable over BW
theory.
3 S-objection
In his second objection, Akiba appeals to Salmon’s argument, claiming that it is
different from Evans’ argument in a crucial way:21
“Salmon uses quantification and variables where Evans uses singular terms. Thus, the
ambiguity between the de re and de dicto readings of ‘it is indeterminate whether a is
identical with b,’ which exists in the original Evans’ argument, does not exist in the
Salmon argument; the argument must be understood de re.” (2015, 9).
As a result, BW solution for Evans’ argument does not work for Salmon’s
argument, or so Akiba argues. Let us start with a brief description of Salmon’s
argument.
20 Parsons (2000) and Abasnezhad and Hosseini (2014) both reject legitimacy of the applica-
tion of λ-abstraction, without appealing to referential indeterminacy. Wilson (2013), on the other
hand, argues that committing to vague objects does not imply a commitment to indeterminate
identity, so Evans’ argument is not an issue at all.
21 As it is argued in the last section, BW theory can explain cases of vague objects that do not
generate RDI, without facing evens’ argument. Accordingly, in this section, I restrict my
discussion to these cases only and show that BW characterization of them is immune from
Akiba’s second objection as well.
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“Suppose that there is a pair of entities x and y…such that it is vague…whether they are
one and the very same thing. Then this pair (x, y) is quite definitely not the same pair as
(x, x), since it is determinately true that x is one and the very same thing as itself. It follows
that x and y must be distinct.” (1981, 243)
Akiba provides the following formalization of the argument
He argues that the argument will remain valid when variables are replaced
with singular terms. That is to say, for every instance of a vague object char-
acterized in BW, the argument proves that it generates contradiction.
Moreover, Akiba thinks that since there is no application of λ-abstraction in
the argument, appealing to referential indeterminacy does not help in blocking
the argument. Therefore, referential indeterminacy does not play any significant
role in a proper defense of vague objects.
In the rest of this paper, I show that, contrary to Akiba’s claim, validity of
the argument actually depends on application of λ-abstraction. In particular, the
correct instantiation of (2) requires application of λ-abstraction. Then, I consider
two possible ways of completing the argument with λ-abstraction and argue that
proponent of BW theory can reject both.
3.1 Against S-objection
Consider the derivation from (2) to (7). Note that P in the second premise is a
monadic predicate, however, it is instantiated with a relation (i. e. identity)
within the scope of a sentential operator (i. e. D), in (7). Obviously a direct
. ∀x (x= x) Law of identity
. ∀x∀y [(x= y) → ∀P (Px → Py)] Leibnitz’s law
. ~D(x= y) ∧ ~D~(x= y) Reductio premise
. ~D(x= y) From ()
. (x= x) Instantiation of ()
. D(x= x) From () by rule of Determination
. (x= y) → [D(x= x) → D(x= y)] Instantiation of ()
. ~(x= y) From (), (), and ()
22 Recall that IA iff ~DA ∧ ~D~A.
23 It is analogue of Necessitation in alethic modal logic.
24 Again, it is presupposed that within S5 from (8) we can derive D~(x= y) contradicting (3).
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instantiation from (2) to (7) is not permitted.25 That is, the argument requires
more details to become valid. In fact, the correct instantiation of P, which is
relevant here, is the monadic predicate λz.D(z= x). This is, a direct consequence
(2) is not (7) but
7’) (x= y) → ([λz.D(z= x)]x → [λz.D(z= x)]y)
So contrary to Akiba’s claim, λ-abstraction is required for the argument to be
valid. Nevertheless, contrary to (4), (6) and (7) in the original proof, (4), (6) and
(7′) do not directly entail ~(x= y). Thus, still further modifications are needed to




I argue that there are good reasons for proponents of BW theory to reject both
arguments. This is because the move from (2) to (7′) presupposes that every
object has the property of being determinately self-identical. However, this
presupposition is unacceptable in BW theory when variables are substituted
with proper names. Recall that vague objects, as characterized in BW theory, are
’. (x = y) → ([λz.D(z= x)]x → [λz.D(z= x)]y) Instantiation of (); [P/λz.Δ(z= x)]
. (x = y) → [D(x= x) → D(x= y)] From (’)
. ~(x= y) From (), (), and ()
. ~ D(x= y) From ()
’. ~ [λz.D(z= x)]y () λ-abstraction
. (x= x) Instantiation of ()
. D(x= x) From  By rule of Necessitation
’. λz.D(z= x)]x () λ-abstraction
’. (x= y) → ([λz.D(z= x)]x → [λz.D(z= x)]y) Instantiation of (); [P/λz.Δ(z= x)]
. ~(x= y) From (’), (’), and (’)
25 It is worth noting that Evans was careful not to make Akiba’s mistake. In fact, if the direct
instantiation from (2) to (7) was legitimate, Evans also would derive (a=b) → [I(a= b) → I(a= a)]
from Leibnitz’s law, which was all he needed to finish his argument. That is, his discussion of
property abstraction would be completely redundant.
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referentially indeterminate due to their ontological status. As a result, for a
vague object a, it is determinate that (a= a), but it is not the case that a has
the property of “being determinately identical with ɑ,” [λx.D(x= a)]. In fact, this
is uncontroversial among BW and Akiba. For instance, in Amoebas example,
Akiba agrees that Sandy2 does not have the property of “being determinately
identical with Sandy2”.
26 Now, let me explain how this point can be used to
block both versions of the argument.
Against the first version
Instantiate x and y in the first argument with a and b, respectively, and let a be a
vague object. As explained above, in BW theory D(a= a) is true and [λz.D(z= a)]a
is false. As a result, [D(a= a) → D(a= b)] does not follow from ([λz.D(z= a)]a →
[λz.D(z= a)]b). That is, the derivation from (7’) to (7) is illegitimate in BW theory.
Therefore, proponents of BW can reject the validity of the first argument.27
Against the second version
Consider the second argument in which x and y are instantiated by a and b,
respectively, and let a be a vague object. Proponents of BW theory can reject the
derivation from (6) to (6′). As explained, D(a= a) is true and [λa.D(a= z)]a is
false, which implies the derivation from D(a= a) to [λa.D(a= z)]a is illegitimate.28
Therefore, the second argument can be blocked as well.
To conclude: I concur with Akiba that Amoeba example generates RDI to
which makes it open to Evans’ argument. However, he is wrong in claiming
that ‘this destroys Williams’s defense of vague objects’; since there are cases of
vague objects characterised in BW theory which do not imply RDI.
Furthermore, BW theory can also block Akiba’s formalization of Salmon’s
argument by appealing to referential indeterminacy, since validity of the
argument depends on application of λ-abstraction. Therefore, BW theory is
not a complete failure, rather its explanatory power is restricted to the cases of
vague objects that do not generate RDI.
26 Similar to the property of “being indeterminately identical to Sandy2”.
27 Note that according to BW, possible worlds, which are called Precisification, are determi-
nate. However, even if [λz.D(a= z)]a would be considered neither true nor false, still the
derivation from (7′) to (7) could be rejected in an proper three-valued semantics, e. g. Strong
Kleene semantics.
28 Alternatively, when b is vague, the derivation from (4) to (4′) is illegitimate.
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